Interview with Simon Murdoch: Commonwealth Oral History Project by Onslow, Sue et al.
1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOICE FILE NAME: COHP Simon Murdoch 
 
 
Key: 
SO: Dr Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
SM: Mr Simon Murdoch (Respondent) 
 
Please Note: The respondent has stipulated that researchers should seek his 
permission before publishing and disseminating work that draws upon this 
interview. 
 
 
SO: Sue Onslow talking to Mr Simon Murdoch in Wellington on Monday 7th 
April 2014. Simon, thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this 
project. I wonder if you could begin please, sir, by saying what was your 
view as a New Zealand diplomat, of the importance of links with Britain, 
links with the Commonwealth when you first joined the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade in ‘72.  Were these diminishing in importance 
because of Britain’s move towards the European Economic 
Community? 
 
SM: No. Not from a point of view of a foreign government because the effect of 
Britain joining the Community was to make New Zealand’s traditional primary 
product trade to the UK more vulnerable; and the only thing that was going to 
protect that market from protectionist pressures led out of Europe, not the UK, 
was UK diplomacy within the community. So as New Zealand didn’t have a 
seat at the table in Brussels, it was up to the British prime minister to basically 
negotiate with the Community to preserve our access to the UK. 
 
SO: This was Geoffrey Rippon’s responsibility. 
 
SM: And Margaret Thatcher. 
 
SO: But in ’70-72? 
 
SM: Well, I’ve leapt ahead, I’m not talking about ’72. I’m talking about a period 
when I was the FPA for Muldoon and Muldoon was attending Commonwealth 
meetings visiting Britain frequently. And the point for us of the Commonwealth 
was that it was important to British Prime Ministers because it was a symbol 
of Britain’s influence in the world. It was important to us to make common 
cause with British Prime Ministers because, in turn, the British Prime Ministers 
were going to Brussels and negotiating to protect our access, against Danish, 
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Irish and French protectionism. And we had no seat at the table directly in 
Brussels. The Community decided its trade policies and British Prime 
Ministers went to Brussels and argued to preserve our access to the UK 
market. So, paradoxically, even though on the face of it Britain’s joining the 
Community was a “diminution” of our ties with the UK, the fact is that that UK 
advocacy for NZ trade access was critical to us especially at that time. 
 
SO: So was there a particular Commonwealth Secretariat, or Commonwealth 
dimension to New Zealand policy on this? 
 
SM: No, no. But in the politics of it, a Prime Minister like Muldoon would have a 
sense that he ought to be supportive of the British Prime Minister in the 
Commonwealth context because the British Prime Minister was supporting 
New Zealand’s trade access. It was, ‘I know this is something important to 
you and this is important to us’. Muldoon understood that the Commonwealth 
was becoming an increasingly difficult place for British Prime Ministers 
because of course every British prime minister was being… 
 
SO: Hauled into the dock? 
 
SM: Yeah. Raked over the coals at Commonwealth meetings, particularly over 
things like Rhodesia, and even South Africa. So for Muldoon it was, to put it in 
the negative: if a British Prime Minister felt abandoned by a New Zealand 
Prime Minister in the Commonwealth context, what would be the incentive for 
a British Prime Minister not to abandon New Zealand. 
 
SO: So there was a quid pro quo? 
 
SM: Well, an unspoken one. I’m really just trying to deal with this point about 
diminution because the impression people had of Muldoon was that he was 
sentimentally attached to Britain and the Commonwealth. But he actually was 
also thinking about this dynamic of finding a value proposition, which would 
persuade Britain to keep making a New Zealand case in Brussels. Is that 
okay? 
 
SO: No, that’s an excellent explanation. And so Muldoon was trying to use 
then the relationship with the British Prime Minister and also with 
Britain, as a lever against… 
 
SM: European protectionism. 
 
SO: Were you making common with the Australians? I know Malcolm Fraser 
felt very strongly about EC protectionism. 
 
SM: No, because Australia lost its access; we didn’t. When Britain entered the 
Community, it negotiated a special arrangement for New Zealand. So the 
issue every year was what quantum of exports, under what conditions, was 
going to be enabled by that special relationship, right? And the French, the 
Irish, the Danes and so on wanted to drain it. They had no interest in having 
New Zealand but they wanted the British market; they didn’t see why New 
Zealand should be in any part of the Community market. 
 
SO: So in terms of hard headed practical policy, in fact there was a need to 
maintain that access between Wellington and London, to serve New 
Zealand national interest? 
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SM: Yeah. It went on for years. It went on until the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 
1988. That was the first time that there was an agreement to put a floor 
underneath our access to Europe. So between 1973-88, there was 15 years 
of a struggle to maintain a trade foothold in Europe for which British support 
was essential. 
 
SO: Yes. The reason I raised Australia is because Malcolm Fraser 
emphasised in his memoirs that he was very keen on trade 
liberalisation, but also had a particular policy to oppose European 
protectionism. And so I just wondered if there was a degree of making 
common cause? 
 
SM: Yes, we had to make a lot of noise wherever we could internationally about 
trade protectionism, particularly agricultural protectionism, and hope that that 
would have some resonance and restraining effect upon European 
protectionism. But the reality was that every year the quantities came up for 
renegotiation. And so while there was a value in generic anti-protectionist 
diplomacy, the fact is that on our own account, we still had to try to protect 
ourselves, directly, bilaterally. So we were not in the same position as the 
Australians. 
 
SO: Thank you for making that important differentiation. In which case when 
you came to the MFA in the 70s, how much was there a general view 
within your department that the Commonwealth represented a useful 
platform for New Zealand’s internationalist … 
 
SM: Well yeah it did. My first boss was David McDowell. David had been in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and involved in the early 70s decolonisation which 
was the great work of the Commonwealth. Its great purpose was to transform 
empire into something sustainable. David had been with Arnold Smith all 
across Africa for the African decolonisations of the 60s; but decolonisation 
was just happening in the South Pacific in the 70s. 
 
So David understood the whole framework for independence, self-
government, for small emergent states. And he went on to become the first 
Director of a re-engineered aid programme, focussed on postcolonial 
development needs in the Pacific and East Asia. In the 70s there were two 
political issues underlying decolonisation in the South Pacific. How was it 
going to be done? What were the new political arrangements going to look 
like? And what were the economic prospects for these very tiny independent 
states? And already by the late 60s and early 70s, the decolonising aspect, 
the political experiment in Africa was starting to show strains. And so that kind 
of failure was an issue, a preoccupying risk. And the role that the 
Commonwealth could perform mattered. The (newly) independent states 
wanted to retain a connection to Britain. Now in a lot of cases, a lot of them 
were monarchies, don’t forget. There was a deep attachment by their ruling 
elite to things British, by and large. 
 
SO: David McDowell, then, was profoundly influenced in his approach by his 
experiences with Arnold Smith, the first Commonwealth Secretary 
General? 
 
SM: Yes, because he’d been and seen decolonisation close up. So that was one 
issue: decolonisation in the South Pacific and the emergence of a regional 
4 
 
political order in the South Pacific. A big and important part of that was the 
future relationship with the Commonwealth Secretariat and CFTC. This was a 
development relationship and we were trying to promote all that. The second 
issue was South Africa. 
 
SO: Yes. If I could just ask you on the question of Pacific Island 
decolonisation and regional political order: Malcolm Fraser put forward 
the idea of a Commonwealth Regional Heads Meeting. 
 
SM: He did. 
 
SO: The first meeting of CHOGRM was in Sydney in 1978, followed by 
meetings in India (1980), Suva (1982) and in Papua New Guinea (1984).  
And by the time Bob Hawke became Prime Minister, it seems to have 
fizzled.   
 
SM: I went to a couple of them with Sir Robert Muldoon. I well remember the one 
in India, the CHOGM (in late 1983.) I might just say about Commonwealth 
regionalism: the regional construct of the Asia Pacific was in its early days 
then. When you look at Asia Pacific regionalism today you see quite a highly 
developed institutionalised format. It’s a brand with some substance, Asia 
Pacific regionalism now, through APEC and PIF and so on. But back in the 
70s it hadn’t really taken shape; ASEAN was very new, the South Pacific 
Forum was very new, but the notion that people from the Pacific and Asia 
didn’t want to go to CHOGMs and have them dominated by African issues, 
was quite palpable. I think Fraser was reacting to that. But Muldoon had a 
more sceptical view. He wasn’t sure that the regional dimension was going to 
really add value, and he and Malcolm Fraser had some differences about 
that. 
 
 Anyway the meeting in New Delhi, and why I remember it, is that the regional 
shipping line, the Pacific Forum shipping line which was a ODA-created 
shipping line and a piece of serious infrastructure for the independent region, 
was in trouble. Anyway, there was a South Pacific leaders’ caucus on what 
was going to be done to rescue the shipping line. And so the reason I 
remember it is that all the leaders came in and sat down; Fraser chaired it, 
which Muldoon didn’t like very much, and in the typical way of the Pacific 
leaders, there were long silences and not much of being said. And then 
somebody would say something and somebody would say something else. 
And then after about three quarters of an hour or an hour or something they 
all said, “Well, that’s it, we’re finished, we’d better go now.” So everybody got 
up and left; and I was sitting there trying to figure out what they agreed. 
[laughter] What had they agreed on? 
 
SO: A classic example of a creative communiqué? 
 
SM: It was, absolutely. That’s the reason I remember it, because I was quite young 
at the time and I really thought, “My God…” And I carefully went back over all 
my notes and talked to my colleagues and we managed to construct 
something. Yeah so that was the regional meeting. 
 
SO: But this whole idea of a Commonwealth regional forum, following 
decolonisation… 
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SM: Got overtaken eventually by the rise of indigenous Asia Pacific regional 
institutions. It did because their real interest was (regional). They didn’t need 
the Commonwealth to enable them to talk to each other, either in the Oceania 
grouping or the East Asia grouping. Once ASEAN began to find its feet and it 
was already … CHOGRM was just an idea which was briefly seen to be a 
way to do something about regionalism. But in the finish it actually wasn’t. 
 
SO: How much do you think there was also an insidious sense that this was 
the Second XI, that they valued the Commonwealth bigger meetings 
precisely because they could have access to larger powers: India, 
Britain, Canada? 
 
SM: You mean, the small states? 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
SM: Well I think it was easier for the Small States than the UN, especially the 
small states of Oceania. And they had some real interests at stake. I would 
say that the small states of the Pacific did attach some value to CHOGMs. 
They could make their case for ODA, they could keep in touch with Britain. It 
was unlikely that a British Prime Minister would ever visit those countries. It’s 
hard to imagine how small and new they were; and the shock of self-
government. So I think there was a genuine value, and eventually the Small 
States and Small State vulnerability did become a central theme of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: After the invasion of Grenada and the Delhi Heads of Government 
meeting? 
 
SM: Well yeah. I was at that, when Mrs Charles spoke. I heard her speak. In the 
general debate, there had surfaced quite a groundswell of ‘Oh, the Americans 
have over reacted and this has just been a piece of … 
SO: American imperialism? 
 
SM: Not quite imperialism, but I think the sense that the military action was a piece 
of political theatre was in the air. It wasn’t being directly talked about as 
plainly as that. Mrs Charles got up and she said, “I want to correct that, and 
tell you about what happened to me and about what happened to my 
country.” And in effect, what she described was a new kind of security risk; in 
these very small states it’s possible for - and we now know perfectly well with 
Haiti and places, and even more so in Africa - it’s possible for a small state to 
be hollowed out by non-state actors, if they’re well organised. It could be a 
criminal group, it could be a paramilitary organisation, it could be any number 
of things. But Mrs Charles turned the mood around completely. She said, 
“This is what really happened” and you could have heard a pin drop. 
 
SO: John Compton also stood up and said, ‘You know that a small and 
determined force could overwhelm mine.’ 
 
SM: Yeah, so small state political vulnerability also began to be put on the agenda 
a bit. It was quite moving actually listening to her. I went to two CHOGMs with 
David Lange, in Nassau and in Vancouver. In 1983, where was I? 
 
SO: Well, you were assistant head of Asia Division, and you went as Political 
Counsellor to Washington. 
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SM: In my memory, and no, my memory’s right, it was in the Bahamas that Mrs 
Charles spoke. And there was a bilateral afterwards with David Lange. And 
Mrs Charles was a former dental nurse and she said, “Ah, you’ve got a 
wonderful school dental programme in New Zealand. Do you think you might 
be able to help us with that?” And Lange was quite sympathetic to, and my 
memory is right. It was in the Bahamas. 
 
SO: What was Robert Muldoon’s general view of the Commonwealth? 
 
SM: He wanted the Commonwealth to be involved in the decolonisation and in the 
post-decolonised new order in the Asia- Pacific. He felt that it was important 
that Britain remained engaged with its former colonies in the South Pacific 
region, directly and through the Commonwealth and he was very strong about 
the economic vulnerability of the small states. So on the one hand, he had a 
sense that there was a role in creating the new post-colonial stability and 
economic viability in Oceania. On the other hand, he was aware our sports 
contacts with South Africa were constantly drawing ever closer scrutiny. And 
there’s no doubt that Ramphal and Anyaoku, as DSG under Ramphal, were 
the bearers of critical views from the wider Commonwealth leadership – and 
warnings, both formal and informal. Public opinion in New Zealand was slowly 
strengthening against apartheid. The Commonwealth was under Ramphal 
and Anyaoku was increasingly one of the leading international voices. 
 
SO: Did you at the MFA have an opinion? Did Muldoon voice an opinion on 
the Gleneagles agreement as a sports boycott? 
 
SM: He created the Gleneagles Agreement. 
 
SO: Yes, he did help to create this.  
 
SM: The Gleneagles Agreement was an attempted diplomatic fix between the 
good of isolating South Africa and what seemed to Muldoon and his party and 
some parts of public opinion in New Zealand, and the equal good which was 
countries have the right to play sport with whoever they want. “Just because 
you played sport with somebody doesn’t mean you agree with their racial 
policies” was the sentiment of the sports bodies, who saw themselves as non-
political. So an attempt to strike a fine balance between those two things. 
 
SO: Had he gone to the Gleneagles retreat with that in his pocket? 
 
SM: Well, I didn’t go to Gleneagles, but my boss in the DPMC did. In the end the 
Gleneagles Agreement turned on that phrase about ‘will make all reasonable 
effort to dissuade’. This phrase was a deliberate ambiguity. Of course the 
predominant feeling in the Commonwealth wasn’t that you should just 
dissuade-passively; it was that a government should actively withdraw from 
sports contacts. And Muldoon was arguing that he wouldn’t do that in our 
democracy, that the sports bodies had rights; and the key difference was 
between a government using its state powers to prevent any contact 
occurring, and a government stopping short of doing that and using limited 
persuasive means to talk the sports authorities into not doing something. So 
the Gleneagles agreement seemed like a way for New Zealand to remain 
inside a Commonwealth consensus about sports contact with South Africa.  
And it eventually came to grief on the fact that when the moment came for 
them to become strongly dissuasive of the rugby union, he went on television 
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here in New Zealand and said that they should think twice. So that didn’t 
seem like strong dissuasion to anybody. 
 
SO: Was this the source of much debate within your department? 
 
SM: Ah, huge, yes. It was the other big issue. Massive. 
 
SO: Was there a divide between you officials? Was there agreement that you 
as a Department should seek to persuade your Prime Minister of the 
international politics of this? 
 
SM: No, it was a contest between influences. Of course the MFA advice covered 
the international political realities. But it was a contest between this advice 
and his politics which were realities also. Domestically, 50% of New Zealand, 
particularly rural and provincial New Zealand, didn’t think the government 
should stop the rugby tour. And the other 50% did. So public opinion was very 
divided. 
 
 Ramphal came to call on him at The Berkeley Hotel in London in early 1981. 
It was Muldoon’s favourite hotel; he’d first gone there after the war. When you 
got demobbed in 1945, they gave you a passage to England. A ship took you 
to England and then you made your way back to New Zealand. They gave 
them some sort of accommodation chit; he always liked to stay in The 
Berkeley. I was sat in the room and took the notes, from which to write up the 
record of the conversation, get him to approve it and send it back to 
Wellington. And then, on return, he’d interpret the discussion in a report to his 
Cabinet colleagues. What had happened in the conversation is that Ramphal 
had outlined to him the consequences for New Zealand of not fulfilling the 
spirit as well as the letter of the Gleneagles agreement. Ramphal said, “It 
would be a series of measures against New Zealand as a public mark of the 
Commonwealth disagreement with NZ policy, if you don’t actively dissuade 
your rugby union from going ahead with this tour.” Muldoon claimed that was 
outside the Gleneagles Agreement, but Ramphal said it was the meaning of it. 
And that exchange was recorded by me, put in the report to Cabinet and 
Muldoon came back to New Zealand, had a discussion with his Cabinet 
colleagues and went on television and issued this famous public appeal to 
“think twice”. 
 
That pretty much was the diplomatic crisis point because from then on, the 
rugby tour went ahead. We had massive civil disorder. I believe myself that 
Muldoon, knew very well what the risks were; faced with two kinds of rejection 
he just had to decide and make the best of it. He’d made his bed politically 
and he was going to lie in it; and he did then win the 1981 election by a very 
narrow margin. But I do think he was not just damaged in the eyes of the 
public, but I think he was damaged himself by the winter of discontent over 
the rugby tour in New Zealand. It was pretty horrific. Every Wednesday and 
every Saturday the police were clashing with protestors; it was a bloody 
winter. 
 
SO: Was there any link that you were aware of between the New Zealand 
rugby union board and the British rugby union association? 
 
SM: I think the rugby people in those days were pretty staunch with each other. 
“This is our game. Why should politicians interfere in it? Who is Sonny 
Ramphal to be telling us what to do?” There was almost no media coverage, 
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or, in those days, seriously credible mainstream voice in New Zealand about 
Africa. Pretty much for most New Zealanders of the middle and older age 
groups, what we knew about South Africa was we played rugby against them. 
 
SO: Against the Springboks, yes. 
 
SM: The consciousness of Sharpeville and Steve Biko and all those things wasn’t 
deep or widespread in the public. It was held by people who were in principle 
morally opposed to apartheid. I don’t really think it was, until probably New 
Zealanders began to get a glimpse of Nelson Mandela that public opinion was 
strengthening against sports contacts anyway. But unless people had lived in 
South Africa, New Zealanders didn’t really understand apartheid as a 
concrete reality. People were opposed to it as an abstract evil, not as a 
system of discrimination. Do you understand what I’m saying? 
 
SO: Yes, I do. 
 
SM: Anyway so in 1981 over the rugby tour that was the moment when those 
things came together. 
 
SO: So there was a sharp change, then, when David Lange becomes Labour 
Prime minister? 
 
SM: Absolutely. Oh yes. 
 
SO: Was there then a debate in your department about a push for economic 
sanctions? 
 
SM: By the end of 81, or start of 82, I had left the Prime Minister’s Department, 
and had gone back to the Foreign Ministry. I wasn’t involved in that sort of 
discussion and then I went to Washington; and the only engagement I really 
had with Commonwealth things was because of the meeting in the Bahamas 
and the other was in Vancouver. 
 
MFA raided nearby posts for people to go and make up the delegation. They 
tried to use people who had been to one before; a couple of them before and 
knew what they were doing. And so really from 81 to 87 or 88, apart from 
going to those CHOGMs, I didn’t have a lot to do with the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So what is your recollection of the Bahamas meeting? David Lange 
described it as there being a tight inner group who were pressing 
Thatcher, and ‘the rest were left pressing our noses against the 
window.’ Is that your recollection of there being a core group that were 
trying to exert pressure on Thatcher for economic sanctions? 
 
SM: Yes, I remember the drama over the communiqué and all that. In the finish, 
Mrs Thatcher was never bothered by standing alone in terms of her domestic 
politics. 
 
SO: Not at all. 
 
SM: And on an issue like this, I think she backed herself and others, that British 
public opinion would support her. 
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SO: Why was Lange left out of that group? It was Bob Hawke, Rajiv Gandhi, 
Brian Mulroney… 
 
SM: Well, have a guess. 
 
SO: Why? 
 
SM: Because at that stage we were in the middle of our anti-nuclear rift with the 
United States, which was also a rift with Australia. And with Britain to some 
extent. It caused great difficulties for Australia and Britain. And both Thatcher 
and Hawke were very jaundiced about David Lange because of it. And I don’t 
think they thought that he belonged; this was the heavy hitters, not the middle 
powers, nor small powers. 
 
SO: In terms of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy: Professor McIntyre on 
Saturday commented that David Lange was a phenomenal politician, 
with a brilliant brain, and a lawyer. Lange’s wit was something that 
Professor McIntyre emphasised. He described how the New Zealand 
press corps made a pact amongst themselves to try to get through one 
of Lange’s press conferences without laughing at any of his jokes; but 
that they never managed that, because Lange was so very funny. 
McIntyre also said he really questioned how much Lange genuinely 
believed in policies, or in political strategies. Does that square with your 
recollection? 
 
SM: I don’t think he connected viscerally with either the left or the right factions of 
the Labour party. I think he was not a great one for being an institutional 
insider. I think he saw himself as outside a lot of those kind of constructs. And 
I think he wasn’t a conviction politician of the left or the right. He was inclined 
to take a less ideological view of things in some ways but he was very clever.  
He could present himself to either side as being in complete intellectual 
sympathy and understanding with their goals and objectives. 
 
SO: That’s an exercise in logic and argumentation. 
 
SM: Yes, as an exercise in logic and argumentation. I think his natural instincts 
were… to have a lot of sympathy and empathy with the needs of the 
disadvantaged and the poor. That was his Christian upbringing. But I don’t 
think he was ever committed to a socialist economy. 
 
SO: Well no, because as Prime Minister, he brought in the factory and trade 
union reforms. 
 
SM: Precisely. 
 
SO: So was then the anti-nuclear policy the trade-off within the Labour party, 
for these reforms? 
 
SM: No, I think the anti-nuclear policy was a touchstone issue for the Left and 
centre Left factions; and economic reform was the touchstone issue for the 
Right. And David Lange had to hold his government together so he moved 
between the two poles and did what he could. I think there’s plenty of 
evidence that they held themselves together as a government for five or six 
years; but finally the tension between the two factions broke into the open and 
the party broke apart. 
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SO: So you were Political Counsellor at the New Zealand Embassy in 
Washington, serving as New Zealand intelligence liaison officer at this 
particular point. Your government’s policy must have made your job 
pretty difficult. 
 
SM: Yeah, well it was what it was. 
 
SO: Yes. Were you involved in any of the negotiations? Was this 
government to government? Were you swept up in the growing standoff 
between the ‘neither-confirm-or-deny’ deterrence, and the anti-nuclear 
advocates? 
 
SM: I had four years of that. Yeah. But it’s nothing much to do with the 
Commonwealth that. 
 
SO: No, it wasn’t; but on the other hand, you have said it had an impact in 
that David Lange was excluded from the inner circles of discussions at 
Nassau. 
 
SM: Yes. 
 
SO: But it was a driving and key policy, polarising policy for New Zealand in 
the region? 
 
SM: Yes, It was a genuine and deep rift with the world’ superpower, and our 
ally/superpower. Yes, so it was pretty serious.   
 
SO: Yes, because Secretary of State George Shultz suspended intelligence 
sharing when… 
 
SM: Oh yeah, yeah, that’s correct. So a diplomat’s job is to try and keep the two 
parties who may have reached a political impasse communicating with each 
other and talking to each other. And keep doors open and keep windows 
open, and keep negotiating and keep trying to promote negotiated outcomes 
to disputes. That’s what we do. 
 
SO: Indeed. I worked with the British Embassy during the Falklands War, so I 
know how that works. 
 
SM: Yes, so that’s your role in the great game, to prevent a deeply felt political 
policy dispute from getting any worse. 
 
SO: So when did you start to feel there was an amelioration of international 
tensions; and this was less of a divisive issue between New Zealand, the 
United States and Australia? By 1986 Gorbachev had of course been 
elected First Secretary of the CPSU, and there was a progressive 
amelioration from the first Geneva Reagan-Gorbachev summit. 
 
SM: That depends how you measure these things. One way that they are normally 
measured is by the degree to which the political leaders, senior political 
leaders of two countries, actually talk to each other and visit each other and 
receive each other. All of that is symbolic of the nature of the relationship. So 
as far as I’m concerned, the tide didn’t really turn until after 9/11. The tide 
didn’t turn until Helen Clarke visited Washington and Condoleezza Rice 
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visited New Zealand. That would be my judgement, and that was post 9/11. 
Up until that point it was a limited and overall less-than-properly functional 
bilateral relationship and had elements of dysfunction in it. 
 
SO: Thank you very much for that reflection. You also went to the Vancouver 
Commonwealth Heads meeting then in 1987, as a product of ‘pulling in 
the troops from the region’ to help the Prime Minister’s delegation. 
 
SM: Yes, yes. 
 
SO: Any particular reflections on that? That was post the Eminent Person’s 
Group [EPG]’s visit to South Africa, Thatcher was under progressive 
pressure for both economic and financial sanctions; David Lange was 
still excluded from the inner circle of counsellors because of the anti-
nuclear policy. 
 
SM: You’ve got to remember that things like the famous Oxford Union debate were 
conducted on British soil. You must remember that from 1982 until the arrival 
of Gorbachev, Europe itself was in the grip of… 
 
SO: The ‘second Cold War.’ I remember that very clearly indeed. 
 
SM: Exactly. So no British Prime Minister would particularly welcome another 
prime minister coming onto his or her soil and in effect indirectly offering a 
comparison between the British Government’s posture and a really activist 
anti-nuclear/pro-disarmament policy. Bob Hawke had an anti-nuclear 
movement in the Australian Labour party; they were full of admiration for 
David Lange and thought Hawke should do the same. 
 
SO: But there was a passionate CND movement in the UK as well, and it was 
endorsed by the British Labour Party. 
 
SM: Right. So Lange was appealing to groups that neither of those prime ministers 
wanted to give too much air time to, because they were both committed to the 
alliance with the United States, right? So you can see why they were 
jaundiced. 
 
SO: Yes, Lange would have been regarded a ‘turbulent’ politician. 
 
SM: Although he said, “We don’t intend to export our policy”, he used other 
countries as a stage for dramatize it. 
 
SO: Yes, yes. I can totally see why they would have a rather dim view of that. 
 
SM: Yes, yes. 
 
SO: So you went back to New Zealand in 1987 and then became head of the 
Policy Advisory group in 1989. This was the era in which Mike Moore 
and then Jim Bolger became Prime Minister? 
 
SM: Well, Lange resigned; Sir Geoffrey Palmer took over, and then when it 
became clear that he was unlikely to be able to win the 1990 election, the 
Labour Party abandoned him and Mike Moore took over the leadership of the 
Labour Party and was very briefly Prime Minister before losing the election in 
1990. And then Jim Bolger came along. In 1990 Palmer had created the joint 
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Prime Minister and Cabinet Department; it was legally part of the civil service 
and politically neutral; headed by a civil servant appointed by our public 
service commission. The first CEO of this new department was David 
McDowell. He was appointed during the Palmer-Moore period. But David left 
to do an international conservation job and in 1991 I took over as the CEO, at 
the time very early on in the Bolger government and stayed right through the 
BoIger years. 
 
SO: So did you accompany Jim Bolger to the Harare Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting? 
 
SM: I went up to Victoria Falls to the retreat and sat around at the great Victoria 
Falls Hotel while the heads were out at Elephant Hills. 
 
SO: Yes. I know that Robert Armstrong went to that meeting as well. It’s not 
just a network of heads at a Commonwealth meeting; it’s a network of 
their officials? 
 
SM: Well, it’s not really. This is the problem. CHOGM is, the only summit I know of 
where the leaders go in without an advisor to the retreat. In Asia and other 
parts of the world they have a leader plus one senior official; and in some 
places they even have a listening room where other senior officials can go 
and listen to the discussion amongst the leaders. 
 
SO: To keep the leader on-side, and on policy? 
 
SM: Well yes, but it does make some sense. I understand the history and thinking 
behind the CHOGM practice it but I never thought it was ever a really good 
model. I thought the Asian model better; you put leaders together in a room 
where there’s not a clutter of officials, and you try to create conditions for 
them to talk freely and frankly. But they are leaders, and they may need some 
support of some sort or another. And they may even prefer it. By the time we 
had the CHOGM in Queenstown… my mind was well made up - that I didn’t 
really care for this as convention.. sanctifying something … 
 
SO: In 1995? 
 
SM: Yes, I said to Jim Bolger, “Well, I’m not prepared to have you go in there and 
chair that for two days without any support from us.” I said, “You’ve got to tell 
Emeka Anyaoku that you want a senior New Zealand official of your choice in 
the retreat.” 
 
SO: And that was really quite an innovation? 
 
SM: Well, I don’t know whether it was, but Mr Bolger did it; I sat through the 
retreat. Anyaoku I think agreed with it. 
 
SO: Informality? Getting heads together? 
 
SM: I thought, “He’s my prime minister. He’s got a huge job on his hands because 
of the stuff about Nigeria - Saro-Wiwa`s pending execution and everything 
was suddenly in diplomatic turmoil. And we had to run the whole multilateral 
meeting. And in our system the PM was also committed to the critical hosting 
aspect bilaterally and public media; appearance logistics etc. I always thought 
he needed an extra pair of eyes and ears; and it needed to be a New Zealand 
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pair of eyes and ears, not the Secretariat’s. I didn’t get in the way of Emeka, 
or anybody, but he was my prime minister and I wasn’t going to leave him in 
that position; and so I went. And it’s what Bolger wanted. 
 
SO: Tell me: in the run up to this 1995 meeting, when was the offer made 
about having the CHOGM in Auckland in the first place? 
 
SM: The retreat was in Queenstown. 
 
SO: Yes, exactly. The CHOGM itself was in Auckland.  
 
SM: The S-G approached … when would they have approached us? I have a 
feeling that we’d actually been approached as early as Vancouver. 
 
SO: Oh really? 
 
SM: Yes.  You know, “it’s your turn coming up.” John Larkindale (ex MFA, 
coordinator of the 1995 CHOGM) would know the exact answer to that, but 
we ourselves had begun to feel that it was something that was within our 
grasp logistically; we weren’t too small to run this properly. 
 
SO: Was there any sense also that this would be useful for New Zealand’s 
renewed internationalism of the 90s? 
 
SM: Yes, I think there was some kind of sense of an idea whose time had come; 
we thought we were big enough and smart enough; and it was the sort of 
thing we could do. And, of course, within four years we had the APEC 
(meeting) in Auckland as well. So yes, it was the first really big international 
conference ever held in New Zealand; the first really, really big one. And, 
apart from the private and public diplomatic drama of it, it was a logistic 
success. 
 
SO: The drama in the run up to the meeting was New Zealand’s anti-nuclear 
stance, and then Nigeria on the eve of the conference. 
 
SM: Yeah. And it was Nigeria. It was a very, very difficult decision to suspend 
Nigeria. It was a wrenching decision for some of the African heads of state, 
including Mandela, because Nigeria had bankrolled and sustained ANC, and 
helped other frontline states as well. Nigeria had used its power and wealth 
and influence on behalf of regional consciousness in Africa. 
 
SO: The news came through of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the 
eight other Ogoni activists just before the retreat. 
 
SM: Yes, on the Saturday morning. They were all leaving Auckland at about 8 
o’clock, for the retreat in Queenstown. 
 
SO: How much was your prime minister, Jim Bolger, right at the front of the 
decision for Nigeria’s suspension, compared to his position on the 
CMAG idea? 
 
SM: He had to chair a meeting of the leaders where the question was right in front 
of him. There wasn’t any possibility of dodging the question of what is this 
meeting of Commonwealth leaders going to do about Nigeria? And on the 
Saturday morning Jim Bolger had a very quick round of soundings of other 
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delegations and leaders as to whether the retreat had to be grasp this issue, 
or not. And they all said, “Yes, we can’t avoid it.” They all realised that there 
was a moment of truth and they would need to face it or lose credibility. It 
would be very damaging to the credibility of the Commonwealth if the leaders 
came out of their retreat without a clear and tangible position. This was no 
time for flimflam and I think Anyaoku was very influential in saying, “No, we’ve 
got to deal with this. There’s no way that a bland communiqué is going to do 
the trick here.” And Bolger felt that himself and so did most of them. So they 
spent the whole of the Saturday wrestling with the issue of whether they could 
reach a consensus to suspend Nigeria. 
 
SO: I understand that Robert Mugabe was one of the leaders who took a 
great deal of persuading, because he felt there shouldn’t be internal 
interference? 
 
SM: Well, it was not just Mugabe. Jerry Rawlings, and others. All spoke more than 
once, several times, and they agonised; they went back and forth. And Nelson 
Mandela was of course very influential. Jim Bolger was a very good chairman 
of a meeting. He had a good ear and he was experienced in hearing what 
people were saying and not saying. His political instinct to summing up and 
just grabbing the essence of a consensus as it was forming was very good. 
And so he chaired them through an extremely difficult meeting to the 
conclusion they came to, and it was done more or less without any visible 
voting or anything. 
 
SO: Consensus again? 
 
SM: Well, it was an interesting example of the way you can achieve a consensus 
by the time nobody’s got any sense of being unheard. People’s decision not 
to speak again could be taken as an indication that they’d said all they wanted 
to say and they would not stand out against an emerging view. It’s quite a 
subtle process. 
 
SO: Yes, it is. Had you already drafted the idea of a Commonwealth 
Ministerial Action Group? 
 
SM: No, I can’t remember the detail of that. My recollection is that that was being 
worked on in the margins by a group of senior officials. I think Britain, Canada 
and Australia may have been leading. John Major came to CHOGM but had 
to go back early because of Memorial Day in the UK. I remember because I 
went out to the airport in Auckland on behalf of the PM to farewell him on the 
Sunday afternoon before the communiqué was released. I can’t remember 
who it was but someone else will tell you no doubt. I think that the Secretariat, 
who was the deputy secretary general then? For Anyaoku? 
 
SO: Sir Humphrey Maud? Or Krishnan Srinivasan. 
 
SM: Yeah, Srinivasan. So the Secretariat and a group of senior officials, including 
the British, South Africans, obviously, and others …  I think that somewhere in 
the margins of the communiqué drafting they were working on the CMAG idea 
because the whole issue of how to treat member states whose governments 
were rights violators and abusers of norms, going back as far as Idi Amin, had 
become critical to Commonwealth credibility. 
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SO: While you were CEO of MFAT (after you’d come back from being High 
Commissioner in Australia), how important was the Commonwealth as a 
platform for New Zealand foreign policy, and used to enhance either its 
bilateral relations with other Commonwealth states, or to boost New 
Zealand’s international standing? International affairs had started to 
change considerably with the growing role of civil society. 
 
SM: It’s a summit. It’s an opportunity for us, New Zealand, to engage countries 
and leaders with whom we have common interests. 
 
SO: So did you think of the Commonwealth as an entity between summits? 
 
SM: It has been and it still is in regard to some of the small states, and small and 
vulnerable states’ issues. The great difference between when Muldoon was 
going to CHOGMs and Helen Clarke is that, for Muldoon, the Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers’ meeting still had some relevance. And you went to the 
Finance Ministers’ meeting and you went onto CHOGM; and then you went 
onto the World Bank and IMF meetings in Washington and you could 
establish positions and seek to form diplomatic alliances with other countries 
to advance issues. You could start at a CHOGM, at a CFM and take them 
forward to Washington. You could caucus. But that was dying by the 80s- 
becoming increasingly irrelevant. The Commonwealth wasn’t an economic 
construct. 
 
This didn’t diminish its political summit value; and in a curious way, it was 
enhanced, as decolonisation moved on to a post-colonial order in Oceania 
and various problems were emerging like Bougainville, the Solomons, trouble 
in Vanuatu, and of course Fiji. Besides political troubles, all of them were 
experiencing economic constraints of one sort or another. The notion that 
small states, particularly small island states, needed more attention; their 
vulnerabilities were no less and indeed maybe greater than some of the 
traditional LLDCs. I do give the Commonwealth some credit for pushing that 
idea into the international consciousness. Being involved with a second 
generation of political leaders in the small and vulnerable states of the Pacific, 
and other parts of the world, is a bit of a brand for the Commonwealth. But for 
us – NZ - in the Asia Pacific region, now that Asia Pacific regionalism is so 
well institutionalised and has its own structures and architecture, we don’t 
need CHOGMs or CHOGRMs to talk to likeminded countries in the Asia 
Pacific. 
 
SO: So what do you then say for the Commonwealth going forward about its 
viability and its areas of activity? What would be your take as the 
foremost senior civil servant on New Zealand’s foreign affairs? 
 
SM: I don’t have an answer to that, Sue. A lot’s been made this being the age of 
globalisation and networking. Civil society networks have a deeper value 
maybe than they once did, and the Commonwealth still stands for something 
about particular kinds of forms of government. It does stand for what you 
might call, at least to some degree, ‘the open society’: tolerance and 
openness and so on. Core principles. So I suppose it can contribute to the 
values debate. But that becomes very sensitive too; New Zealand and 
Pakistan don’t necessarily view politics or governance or how do you keep 
your country upright in the same, or even similar terms. It’s a very different 
question if you’re living in Pakistan from living in New Zealand. 
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So you can only take so far, in practice, the idea that arising from the core 
principles there’s a set of commonly applicable values. And I don’t want to 
take it too far. I have a feeling that nothing lasts forever and maybe what will 
happen is that in 50 years’ time, if there are changes in constitutional 
relationships with Britain and the UK, with all the talk about republics and 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
SO: I was going to ask, how far do you feel that the Queen has been that 
‘invisible glue’ for the Commonwealth? And what does that say for the 
headship going forward? 
 
SM: Well, I think there’s something to be said for it. There are plenty of things you 
hang on to; you’re not quite sure of their residual value, but faced with the 
choice of actually not having them versus having them? No New Zealand 
Prime Minister that I’ve worked for has ever said, “I think we should be out of 
the Commonwealth.” And I don’t see that happening. 
 
SO: How much did you, given your very senior position in Foreign Affairs, 
value having a New Zealand Secretary General? 
 
SM: Well, I’ve got a lot of time for Don McKinnon. He’d been a very good Foreign 
Minister so I was glad for him personally. I felt he would succeed but within 
limits not of his making. I thought it might be very difficult for him personally to 
be credible in Africa and Asia, just because he was “old (white) 
Commonwealth”. Emeka (Anyaoku) had a lot going for him in that respect, 
and so did Ramphal for that matter. And I didn`t think the Commonwealth as 
an international political institution was capable of being lead forward to a new 
and more golden destiny; it was a question of ‘Could it find a limited but 
nonetheless reasonably positive, value proposition in international (affairs), in 
the crowded world of international relations?’ Could it cleverly, carefully and 
wisely, play itself into being part of solving a recognised political dispute or 
problem, and then deliver? It’s like anything: if people are actually looking for 
a way out and a Commonwealth Secretary General presents himself, maybe 
something will happen? And that’s all to the good. So it’s around that informal 
dispute resolution possibility that you think ‘Maybe, yes, maybe it can have 
some occasional and incidental, but serious role as a dispute resolver or 
mediator.’ I can’t get much beyond that. 
 
SO: I’m aware that McKinnon, while Secretary General, was faced with and 
put forward solutions to Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, political 
upheaval in Fiji, and also supported small states against the OECD. 
 
SM: On the Bougainville peace process, he legitimately deserves his share of 
credit for when he was New Zealand’s Foreign Minister. It was important to 
involve the Commonwealth and others, but the grunty part of Bougainville was 
done bilaterally by New Zealand. Australia couldn’t do it. The Solomons, 
however, was an Australia/New Zealand stabilisation intervention. And East 
Timor was an Australia/New Zealand plus important others stabilisation 
intervention. What I’m saying is that in all three cases, I don’t think you can 
attribute any of them to multilateral or plurilateral diplomacy. Sure, the UN and 
the Commonwealth, to some extent, and even ASEAN and the PIF to some 
extent, might be considered important legitimisers of these sort of operations.  
And indeed we wouldn’t do things unless you can be reasonably sure we 
were going to have some of that. You can’t just do these things; you’ve got to 
have consent and legitimacy for them. You can’t just go around the world 
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landing on people’s doorsteps and saying, “We’ll fix your problem for you.” So 
external legitimisers and support is very important: if you’ve got the consent 
and the permission to go in and stabilise; or bring post conflict stability, or 
restore order, or whatever you want to call it. You’ve also actually got to be 
able to carry it out. 
 
SO: You need the ‘hard power’ which the Commonwealth, as a ‘soft power’ 
organisation, doesn’t have? 
 
SM: Thank you, yes, well put. That’s what I wanted to say. 
 
SO: Thank you very much indeed, Simon. 
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
